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270 CALIFORNIA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO. fl. [59 C.2d 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COM. 
[So F. No. 21031. In Bank. Mnr. 7, 1963.] 
CALIFORNIA MOTOR TRANSPORT COMPANY, et at, 
Petitioners, V. PUBLIC U'l'lLITIES COMMISSION, 
Respondent; AIRWAY TRUCKING COMPANY, Real 
Party in Interest. 
[1] Public Utilities-Orders of Oommission-Findings.-Pub. Util. 
Code, § 1705, requiring the Public Utilities Commission to 
state separately findings on all issues material to its decision, 
governs application proecedings as well as complaint pro-
ceedings. 
[2] Id.-Orders of Oommission-Findings.-The requirement in 
Pub. Util. Code, § 1705, that decisions by the Public Utilities 
Commission shall contain, separately stated, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law on all issucs material to an ordcr or de-
cision, is not met by an ultimate finding of public com'enience 
and necessity. Every issue that must be resolved to rNtch that 
ultimate finding is "matelial to the order or decision." 
[3] Administrative Law-Procedure-Findings.-Findings mate-
l'ial to an administrative order or decision afford a rational 
basis for judicial rcvie,w. 
[4] Id.-Judicial Review-Scope: Public Utilities-Order of Oom-
mission-Judicial Oontrol.-Though the scope of review of an 
administrative decision is limited, as on a writ of review to 
de.termine, whether the Public Utilities Commission has regu-
larly pursued its authority in making a finding of public 
convenience and necessity for the issuance of a certificate to 
operate as a highway common carrier (Pub. Uti!. Code, § 1757), 
findings on material issues enable the revie.wing court to deter-
mine whether the agency has aeted arbitrarily. 
[5] Public Utilities-Order of Oommission-Findings.-Under Pub. 
UtiI. Code, § 1705, the Public Utilities Commission must sepa-
rately state findings and conclusions on the material issues of 
fact and law that determine the ultinwtc issue of puhlic COll-
venience and necessity. 
[6] Id.-Orders of Oommission-Findings.-Though it is 'within the 
discretion of the Public Utilities COlllmission to determine the 
factors material to public convenien~e and necessity, Pub. Util. 
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, §§ 162, 
163; Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §§ 447 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 6] Public Utilities, § 49(5); [3] 
Administrative Law, § 109; [4] Administrative. Law, § 145; Public 
Utilities,-§ 6L 
) 
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Code, § 1705, requires the commitision to stnte what those 
factors nre and to make findings on the material issues that 
ensue there from. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Public Utilities 
Commission granting a new certificate of public convenience 
U1Hl11ecessity to a highway common carrier. Order annulled. 
Graham, James & Rolph, Boris H. Lakusta, Raymond A. 
Grcene, Jr., and E. Myron Bull, Jr., for Petitioners. 
William M. Bennett, Mary Moran Pajalich and Bernard F. 
Cummins for Respondent. 
Wade & Wade and James W. Wade for Real Party in 
Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Airway Trucking Co. applied to the Public 
Utilities Commission for a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity that would extend its operating authority as a high-
way common carrier. After a hearing the commission ordered 
the removal of some of the restrictions on Airway and granted 
a new certificate. The only finding the commission made was 
the ultimate one of public convenience and necessity. Compet-
ing carriers who protested in that proceeding were denied a 
rehearing, and upon their petition we issued a writ of review. 
Petitioners contend that section 1705 of the Public Utilities 
Code, as amended in 1961,1 requires the commission to state 
separately findings on aU issues material to its decision, that 
the commission did not comply with that section, and that it 
therefore did not regularly pursue its authority. (See Pub. 
Util. Code, § 1757.) The commission contends that section 1705 
governs only complaint proceedings and that in any event it 
'Section 1705 provides in part (amendment in italics): 
"At the time fixed for any hearing before the commission ••• the 
compIninant .and the corporation or person complained of, and such 
corporations or persons as the commission allows to intervene, shall be 
entitled to be heard and to introduce evi(lcnce. The commission shall issue 
process to enforce the attendanc;e of an necessary witnesses. After the 
conclusion of the hearing, the eommiRsion shall make and file its order, 
containing it.s decision. 7'hc dl'ci3ion a/lall contain, separately stated, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the commission 011 all issues 
material to tile order or aecisiO'l!. A copy o.f such order .•• shall be 
served upon the corporation or person complained of. . .. The order 
shall ••• take effect and become operative 20 days after the service 
thereof •••• " 
) 
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complied with the section even if it also governs application 
proceedings. 
Section 1701 of the Public Utilities Code provides that "all 
hearings, investigations, and proceedi~\gs" are governed by 
sections 1701 through 1709. Those sections make no distinction 
between application proceedings aud complaint proceedings. 
Section 1705 itself refers to "any hearing before the commis-
sion." [1] The commission contends, however, that Clem-
mons v. Railroad Com., 173 Cal. 254, 258 [159 P. 713], held 
section 61a of the Public Utilities Act (Stats. 1915, ch. 91, 
p. 158), the predecessor of section 1705, inapplicable to a rate 
application proceeding, and that the Legislature amended 
section 1705 in the light of that holding. 
This contention overstates the holding in the ClemmOlls 
ease. That case concerned a provision in section 61a that after 
a hearing the commission's order would be effective 20 days 
after service thereof upon the "persons complained of." The 
court reasoned that in a rate application every consumer is a 
"person complained of," and that it would be impractical to 
delay effectiveness of an order until it was served on all 
consumers. It was implied, however, that the other provisions 
of section 61a did extend to application proceedings in view 
of the applicability of section 62 (now section 1707 of the 
code), which provided: "Any public utility shall have a right 
to complain on any of the grounds upon which complaints are 
allowed to be filed by other parties, and the same procedure 
shall be adopted as in other cases, except that the complaint 
may be heard ex parte by the commission or may be served 
upon any parties designated by the commission." The court in 
the Clemmons case thus indicated that a rate a.pplication was 
a "complaint" by a public utility. The complaint procedure, 
including the procedure required by section 61a, therefore also 
extended to application proceedings, except that the "persons 
complained of," the persons upon whom the order should be 
served, were only those "parties designated by the commis-
sion" under section 62. In sum, even under the Clemmons 
case, the requirement of findings added to section 1705 in 1961 
would govern application proceedings by way of section 1707. 
Moreover, the commission itself has interpreted section 1705, 
before its amendment in 1961, as ('overing application as well 
as complaint proceedings. It has allowed parties to intervene, 
has compelled the attendance of ne('essary witnesses, and has 
made and filed its orders in many application proceedings in 
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accord with tIll' 1'l'liuil'Cllll'llls of Sl't'tioll 1705. It has 1I0t distiu-
guishrd betwr('n applieatiolls and complaints in proceeding 
under section 1705 anu has Ilth'an('rtl no poliq rcasons for 
making such a distinction. 
It is clear from the lrgislative history that it was the purpose 
of the sponsors of the :lmcudment to section 1705 to make it 
apply in application procrcdings as well as complaint proceed-
ing'S. (See 33 State Bar J. 421, 425.) Although the Legislature 
rejected the greater part of thc Lill of which the amendmcnt to 
section 1705 was a part, the amendment itself was cnaded 
exactly as submittE'd by its sponsors. (H)39 St'll. Bill 255; 1961 
Assem. Bill 1732 ; Stab;. 1961, eh. 1118, § 1.) It was apparently 
the purpose of the Lrgislaturc, like that of the sponsors, to 
make the reqnirCllH'lIt of findings govern application as wcll as 
complaint proeeeding's. 
[2] There is no merit in the commi"sion's contE'ntion ~hat 
the requirement of findill:~s was met hy the ultimate finding' of 
public convenience and llecrssity. Every issue tbat must be 
resolved to reaeh that ultimate finding is "material to the oraer 
or dceision." Statutes lik<' section 1705 have been held to 
require finding'S of thc basic facts upon which the ultimate 
finding is based. (Bnwiff Airways. Tllc. v. Civil .l1erono!ltic.~ 
1:oa1'(1 , 306 F.2d 739, 742-743; WLOX Broadcastinfl Co. '-. 
Federal Coml1lllllicotion.~ Com., 260 F.2d 712, 718; Srtginoll1 
Bl'oadcasting Co. v. Fcdcl'al Commltllicntion.~ Com., 96 F.2rl 
:'54,559-563 [68 App. D.C. 282]. I"'I·t. dplIied, 305 U.S. 613 [5!l 
S.Ct. 72, 83 hEtl. 391] ; Jli.~sO'lI'I· Bl'oarlcastin:; CO. V. Fede1'Ol 
CO)/liJ!lUlicntioIlS COill .. D-1 P.2.! Gn. fl23 [flR Apr.D.C. Hi41: 
Reynolds v. 1(onna'n (D.C.) 96 A.2d 362, 366·367; Laney v. 
Holln'ook, 150 Fln. G22 [8 So.2(1 463, 4fl7·469, 146 A.L.R. 202] : 
Yowell v. Cleveland. C., C. (C, St. L. Ry. Co., 360 Ill. 272 [195 
N.B. 667] ; LOlli.~villc & N. R.n. V. lllinois Commerce Com., 3;')3 
Ill. 375 [187 N.E. 449] ; ChicIJUo, n.I. & P. Ry. v.lUinois C011l-
merce Com., 346 Ill. 412 [179 N.E. 126] ; Kewanee &; O. By. v. 
JUillois CO/Hmerce Com .• :340 11L 266 [172 N.E. 706, 707-708] ; 
Public Service Com. v. ["art 'Wayne Union By. (Ind.) 111 N.E. 
2d 719, 72:3, 726; Delaware, L. tl'; W. R.R. Co. v. City of Hobo-
ken, 10 N.J. 418, 424-428l91 A.2<1 739].) Before section 1705 
was amt"urled finflillg'.;; otht;!' than tlw ultimatc finding of publi{' 
convenience and neel'ssity werc not l'erIllired. (Southern Cali-
fornia Freight Lines v. Public Utilities Com., 35 Ca1.2c1 586, 
592-593 [220 P.2d 393] ; cr. Martin v. A.lcoholic Beverage etc. 
Appeals Board, 52 Ca1.2c1 259, 264-265 [341 P.2d 291]; 
.. ) 
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Southern Pac. 00. v. Ra·ilroad Oom., 13Ca1.2d 89, 108-113 [Si 
P.2d 1055].) It is reasonable to assume that the amenument 
of section 1705 was not an idle act and that it was the purpose 
of the Legislature to change the existing law by requiring 
findings 011 all material issues. (See Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 
Ca1.2d 746, 750 [82 P.2d 1].) 
[3] Such findings afforu a rational basis for judicial 
review. (See 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) 
§ 16.05.) The more general the findings, the more difficult it is 
for the reviewing court to asel'l'tain the principles relied upon 
by the administrative agency. [ 4] Even ,vhen the scope of 
review is limited, as in this case (Pub. UtH. Code, § 1757), 
fiudings on material issues enable the reviewing court to 
determine whether the commission has acted arbitrarily. (See 
State v. Tri-State Tel. &- Tel. 00., 204 Minn. 516 [284 N.W. 
294, 300-301] ; Jaffe, Administrative Findin!Js or The ilmcer 
in America (1949) 34 Cornell IJ.Q. 473, 492-493.) The ultimate 
finding of public convenience and necessity is so general that 
without more, a reviewing court can only guess at ho,v it was 
reached. (See New York v. Unitcd States, 331 U.S. 284, 351-
354 [67 8.Ct. 1207, 91 L.Ed. 1492] [dissent]; Vendemia v. 
Oristaldi, 221 F.2d 103, 104-105; Mississippi River Fuel Oorp. 
v. Federal Power Oom., 163 F.2d 433, 449: New Jet'scu Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Oommunications Workers, etc. 0.1.0., 5 N.J. 354. 
374-379 [79 A.2d 721] ; Klawansky v. Public Service Com., 123 
Pa. Super. 375 [187 A. 248, 249-250] ; New Engla.nd Tel. (f; 
Tel. Co. v. Kennelly, 81 R.I. 1 [98 A.2d 835, 837-838] ; Clal'le, 
Federal Developments in Administrativc Law (1956) 44 Cal. 
L. Rev. 321, 334.) 
Since findings on matedal iRsues indicate the baRisfor the 
decision the parties can prepare accordingly for reh('aring or 
review. (See Barry v. O'Oonl1ell, 303 N.Y. 46 [100 N.E.2d 127, 
129-130].) "Furthermore, a disappointed party, whether he 
plans further proceedings or not, deserveR to have the satis-
faction of knowing why he lost his casl'." (2 Davis, Adminis-
trative Law Treatise (1958) § 16.05.) Findings on material 
isstH's are arso helpful to anyone rlannill~ activities that might 
involve similar qu('stions. (See Friendly, The Federal Admin-
i.~trative A!Jencies: The Need for Better Definition of Stand-
ards (1962) 75 Harv. IJ. Rev. 863, 878-879.) 
Findings 011 material issues eall also serve to help the com-
mission avoid ('areless or arbitmry action. (See State v. 
McPhee, 6 Wis.2d 190 [94 N.W.2d 711,717-718] ; Feller, Prol-
) 
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pectus fur thc Furtlto' S:u,;y of Peel, rol Administrative Law 
(1938) 47 Yall.' IJ .• J. G-l7, G(jG; JafTc, Ad,lIillisirative Procedure 
He-E.ramillc": The Belljamin Report (1943) 56 IIarv.hRl'v. 
704, 722-7:2:3.) "0 HCIl a st t'oug impression that, Oll the Lasis 
0:: tile C\";,!l'iii't', the fad::; arc thus-anu-so giws way ,,·!tCll it 
cmdl'S to cxprl;;,'iillg' that impressioll 011 papcl'." (2 Da\'is, 
Admilli'Hl'a!ive I.1uW Treatise (H158) § 16.05, quoting Judge 
Frank iil L'lIilcd States v. For·ness, 125 F.2d 928, 942, eel't. 
denied 316 U.S. 694 [G2 S.Ct. 1293,86 L.Ed. 1764] ; see Frank, 
Say It With Music (1948) 61 IIarv. L. Rev. 921, 949-950; 
Landis, T1:e A;!I;iin;strotiL'e l'I'OCCSS, The Third Decade (1961) 
47 A.B.A .• J. 136, 137.) There is 110 assurance that an adminis-
trative agelley hi).> made a reasoned analysis if it need state 
only tlh' ultimak '1lld;l'~~ of puhlic cOllYeJ1iellCe and necessitr. 
(See Lan(li;;, Heport on Rcgulatory Agencies to the President-
Elect, p. 53, Comm. Print] 960 oE SCI:atc Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 86th COil;;' .• 2([ S~ss.\ 
[5] ,\Yc eont'lude that HIH1,-'l' section 1705, the commission 
must separntrly state filldings und conclusions upon the mate-
rial iflsul's of fact and law that dptC'l'llline the ultimate issue of 
public eonvcnience and n('c(';;sity. Petitioners sug~eflt that in 
this ('afle the commission should make findings on the adequacy 
of exiflting' sl'rvice, the ability of the appli('ant to rcnder the 
proposed sl'J'yice, and the impflC't eertiilcati011 of th(' applicant 
would have 011 other carriers. It is appal'cnt from the record 
that the commission brli('\'('s that these fMton; are material to 
the determination of public ('onWI1!elll'e and neccssit~r. 
[6] Thcll~'h it is within th(' dis"l'etion of the commission tn 
dctermiI;e the factors mat(,l'ia 1 to public cOllvcnience and 
IH'ecssity (Los Angclc.~ it! etropolitan Transit A ufhority v. 
Public Utilities Com .. 52 Ca1.2(1 655. 658-659 [343 P.2cl 913] ; 
San DicflO etc. Fary Co. v. Railroad Com .. 210 Cal. 504. 509, 
513 [292 P. 640] ; see Southern Pac. Co. v. PI/blie Utilities 
Com., 41 Ca1.2d 354. 367 [260 P.2d 70)), section 1705 requires 
it to state what thm;e faetors are and to make findings on the 
material issll(,s that ('nsue therefrom. 
The order is annulled. 
~ 
Gibson, C. J., Schau('r, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, 
J., and White, J.,. concurred. 
*Retired Just ice of the Supreme Court sitting pro tempore under as· 
signment by the Chairman of the Judicial CoUnciL 
